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THE DAUBERT DECISION ON THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE SUPREME COURT
CHOOSES THE RIGHT PIECE FOR ALL THE
EVIDENTIARY PUZZLES
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED*
[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on
context .... I
On June 28, 1993, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.2 In Daubert, the Court clarified the standard for the admis-
sion of scientific evidence in federal court.3 The decision itself at-
tracted a good deal of publicity.4 In part, the decision attracted so
much attention because it was preceded by an intense contro-
* Professor of Law, University of California at Davis; former Chair, Evidence Section,
American Association of Law Schools; B.A., 1967, University of San Francisco; J.D., 1969,
University of San Francisco.
1 King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 570, 574 (1991).
2 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
3 Id. at 2799. Justice Harry Blackmun stated:
"[Gleneral acceptance" is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific
evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence-especially
Rule 702-do assign the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony
both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evi-
dence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.
Id.
4 Edward Imwinkelried, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Christophersen v. Al-
lied-Signal Corp.: The Neglected Issue of the Validity of Nonscientific Reasoning by Scien-
tific Witnesses, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 475 (1993); Bert Black & John Andrew Singer,
From Frye to Daubert: A New Test for Scientific Evidence, 1 SHEPARD's EXPERT & Sci. EVID.
Q., July 1993, at 19 [hereinafter SHEPARD's]; Stephen A. Brunette, Daubert Has Immediate
Impact?, 1 SHEPARD's, July 1993, at 107; George W. Conk, Commentary: Daubert v. Merrell
Dow, 1 SHEPARD's, July 1993, at 59; James Dam, Supreme Court Allows More Scientific
Evidence, LAw. WKLY. USA, July 5, 1993, at 1; Michael D. Green, Relief at the Frying of
Frye: Reflections on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1 SHEPARD'S, July 1993, at
43; Peter Huber, Science on Trial, CHEMISTRY & INDusTRY, Aug. 2, 1993, at 604; Thomas W.
Kirby, Putting Experts Under Scrutiny, LEGAL TmIEs, July 26, 1993, at S38; Barry J. Nace,
Reaction to Daubert, 1 SHEPARD'S, July 1993, at 51; Natalie Angier, Ruling on Scientific
Evidence: A Just Burden, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1993, at A12; Supreme Court's Frye Ruling
Seen as "Two-Edged" Sword, 7 CRIM. PRAc. MANUAL (BNA), July 21, 1993, at 345.
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versy5 over the introduction of so-called "junk science."6 Twenty-
two amicus briefs were filed in Daubert on behalf of such inter-
ested parties including the American Medical Association, the As-
sociation of Trial Lawyers of America, the Carnegie Commission,
the Chamber of Commerce, the Defense Research Institute, the
National Association of Manufacturers, and the United States
Government.7 On the one hand, in Galileo's Revenge: Junk Sci-
ence in the Courtroom,8 Peter Huber had charged that American
courts had lowered the threshold for admitting expert testimony
to the point that many juries were returning erroneous verdicts
based on pseudo-scientific theories propounded by charlatans and
quacks.9 Critics such as Huber urged the courts to vigorously en-
force the prevailing Frye test,'" requiring that scientific testimony
be based on generally accepted, consensus theories. On the other
hand, the advocates of more liberal admissibility standards ar-
gued that the traditional, conservative standards blocked the ad-
mission of critical, and reliable scientific evidence.1 1
5 Sharon Begley, The Meaning of Junk: What's "Good" Science? The Supreme Court
Tackles the Question, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1993, at 62; David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in
the Courtroom, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1993, at A15; Marcia Coyle, Supreme Court to Ex-
amine Scientific Proof, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 1, 1993, at 1; Paul M. Barrett, Top Court Agrees to
Clarify Use of Scientific Evidence in Trials, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1992, at B9; Joan Bis-
kupic, High Court to Review Expert-Witness Standards in Product Case, WASH. POST, Oct.
14, 1992, at A6; Linda Greenhouse, High Court to Rule on Admissibility of Scientific Evi-
dence in U.S. Courts, N.Y. TImEs, Oct. 14, 1992, at A16; "Junk Science" and Justice: Court
Will Decide When Expert Opinions Are Admissible, MissouLLN, Oct. 14, 1992, at A3; Tony
Mauro, Bendectin Case to Test 'Junk Science", USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 1992, at 9A.
6 See PETER W. HUBER, GALIEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE CoURTRooM 2-3
(1991) [hereinafter GALILEo's REVENGE]. The author stated:
Junk science is the mirror image of real science, with much of the same form none of
the same substance. There is the astronomer on the one hand, and the astrologist, on
the other .... Take the serious sciences of allergy and immunology, brush away the
detail and rigor, and you have the junk science of clinical ecology... [Junk science] is a
hodgepodge of biased data, spurious inference and logical legerdemain, patched to-
gether by researchers whose enthusiasm for discovery and diagnosis far outstrips their
skill. It is a catalog of every concievable error: data dredging, wishful thinking trucu-
lent, dogmatism, and, now and again, outright fraud.
Id.
7 See Brief for the American Law Professors, Daubert (No. 92-102); Brief for the Ameri-
can Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics, Daubert (No. 92-102); Brief for Physicians, Scien-
tist, and Historians of Science, Daubert (No. 92-102); Brief for the American Insurance
Assoc., Daubert (No. 92-102); Brief for the American Assoc. for the Advancement of Science
and the National Academy of Sciences, Daubert (No.92-102); Brief for the Washington
Legal Foundation, Daubert (No. 92-102).
8 Huber, supra note 4, at 604.
9 Peter W. Huber, Quoth the Maven, 23 REASON, Nov. 1991, at 40.
10 Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11 Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1637, 1639 (1993).
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The Daubert case is the most famous of the over 2,000 Bendec-
tin lawsuits filed.' 2 The Daubert lawsuit was originally filed by
Jason Daubert and his parents. Jason suffered from serious birth
defects."3 He and his parents alleged that the cause of the defects
was his mother's prenatal ingestion of Bendectin. 14 Bendectin is a
prescription antinausea drug manufactured by the defendant,
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals ("Merrell Dow"). 15 Although the
plaintiffs originally filed suit in California state court, Merrell
Dow had the suit removed to federal court on the basis of diversity
of citizenship.' 6
Before trial, Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment. Mer-
rell Dow rested its motion in large part on an affidavit by Dr.
Steven H. Lamm. The affidavit stated that Dr. Lamm had re-
viewed all the published epidemiological research investigating a
possible causal connection between Bendectin use and birth de-
fects. 1 7 Dr. Lamm stated that he had read 30 studies involving
over 130,000 patients. Dr. Lamm added that none of the studies
had unearthed a statistically significant relationship between
Bendectin and the incidence of birth defects.'" On the basis of the
affidavit, Merrell Dow asserted that the theory that Bendectin
caused birth defects simply was not generally accepted in scien-
tific circles.
The plaintiffs opposed the summary judgment motion. They
countered Dr. Lamm's affidavit with affidavits from eight experts.
The plaintiffs' affidavits pointed to a variety of types of evidence
indicating a nexus between birth defects and Bendectin use such
as live animal studies, test tube research, pharmacological com-
parisons of the chemical structure of Bendectin and drugs known
to cause birth defects, and the reanalysis of the epidemiological
studies cited in Dr. Lamm's affidavit. The plaintiffs' affidavits
stated that upon reanalysis, the totality of the data in the re-
ported epidemiological studies indicates a statistically significant
12 Huber, supra note 4, at 604.
13 See Coyle, supra note 5, at 1. Jason Daubert was born without three fingers on his
right hand and a major bone in his right arm. Id.
14 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1229 (9th Cir. 1991).
15 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989)
16 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791 (1993).
17 See Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.
18 Id. Dr. Lamm stated that after reviewing the studies he found "no difference in the
risk of birth defects between those infants whose mothers had taken Benedictin during the
first trimester of pregnancy and those infants whose mothers had not." Id.
1993]
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relationship.
The federal district court granted summary judgment to Merrell
Dow. 19 The district court judge relied primarily on Federal Rule of
Evidence ("Rule") 703.20 That statute reads:
Bases of Opinion Testimony By Experts
[T]he facts or data in the particular case upon which an ex-
pert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by
or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
The judge focused on the language, "of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field,"2 in the second sentence of
the statute. The judge concluded that language essentially codi-
fied the Frye standard, demanding that the foundation for scien-
tific evidence include proof that "the principle upon which it is
based [is] sufficiently established to have general acceptance in
the field to which it belongs."22 He interpreted the earlier federal
decisions as ruling that a finding of "causation in this area" cannot
be deemed generally accepted unless it is supported by epidemio-
logical studies demonstrating a statistically significant connec-
tion. Since none of the studies did, the judge ruled in Merrell
Dow's favor.
The plaintiffs appealed the order of summary judgment to the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,23 which affirmed the or-
der.24 Although the Ninth Circuit reached the same result as the
district court, the Ninth Circuit employed a different rationale.
As previously stated, the district judge premised his decision on
the Federal Rules of Evidence (the "Federal Rules"), notably Rule
703. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly invoke any
provisions of the Federal Rules. Instead, the court relied squarely
on the common law, as announced in Frye. Rather than applying
any standard prescribed by Congress, the court declared that
"[w]e impose this [Frye test] because [scientific] evidence creates a
19 Id. at 570.
20 FED. R. EVID. 703.
21 Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 572.
22 Id.
23 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991).
24 Id.
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substantial danger of undue prejudice ... [due to] its aura of spe-
cial reliability and trustworthiness."25
The Ninth Circuit then proceeded to apply the Frye test to the
lower court's record. The circuit court conceded that the plaintiffs'
experts' affidavits suggested that a reanalysis of the reported epi-
demiological data would yield a statistically significant relation-
ship between birth defects and Bendectin.2 6 However, the court
found what it regarded as a fatal flaw in the plaintiffs' showing:
the reanalysis had not been published in a peer-reviewed, scien-
tific journal.2 ' The court announced that "the reanalysis of epide-
miological studies is generally accepted by the scientific commu-
nity only when it is subjected to .. .scrutiny by others in the
field"2 8-that is, the scrutiny which occurs upon publication in a
peer-reviewed journal. Citing Galileo's Revenge, the court as-
serted that "good science" is "the science of publication,... consen-
sus and peer review."
Just as they had appealed the district court decision, the plain-
tiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to chal-
lenge the Ninth Circuit's judgment, which was granted. The
Supreme Court thereafter reversed.29
Negatively, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the en-
actment of the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.3 ° In
authoring the lead opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun acknowl-
edged that the Frye standard has been widely accepted, but he
concluded that the test did not survive the passage of the Federal
Rules." In his judgment, neither the text nor the legislative his-
tory of the Federal Rules manifests any intention to prescribe a
test of general acceptance. 2
In prior cases, the Rehnquist Court had adopted a textualist or
"plain meaning" approach to the construction of statutes.3 In con-
struing congressional enactments, earlier Supreme Courts had at-
tached great weight to extrinsic legislative history materials such
25 Id. at 1130.
26 Id. at 1130-31.
27 Id. at 1131.
28 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991).
29 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993).
30 Id. at 2794.
31 Id. at 2792-94.
32 Id.
33 William Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 628 (1990).
19931
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as committee reports.3 4 Earlier Courts had frequently allowed
such materials to "trump" the seemingly plain meaning of the text
of a statute.35 However, the members of the current Rehnquist
Court are skeptical of the wisdom of placing heavy reliance on ex-
trinsic material. To begin with, "all that Congress enacts into
'law'" is the statutory text itself.36 Moreover, extrinsic materials
are usually generated by committee staff persons whom special
interest groups sometimes influence to slant the report.37 The re-
port might mislead a court construing the statute into "giving the
group by way of interpretation what the legislature refused to
grant."3 8 In its previous decisions construing the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the Rehnquist Court had consistently followed a textu-
alist approach.3 9
In Daubert, the Court once again assayed a textualist approach
to reading the Federal Rules. Justice Blackmun noted Federal
Rule 402 which provides that all logically relevant evidence is ad-
missible "except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory author-
ity."40 The quoted language omits any reference to case or deci-
sional law. The omission implies that the courts no longer possess
the common-law power to create and enforce uncodified exclusion-
ary rules. The Justice approvingly quoted the late Professor Ed-
ward Cleary, the reporter for the Federal Rules of Evidence: "In
principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence re-
mains."4 ' In Justice Blackmun's words, although federal courts
may consult common-law precedents to help them interpret am-
biguous provisions in the Federal Rules, "the [Federal] Rules oc-
cupy the field" otherwise.42 One consequence of that occupation
34 OTTo HETZEL, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS: CASES AND MATERIALS 205 (1980).
35 Eskridge, supra note 33, at 628.
36 Id. at 648.
37 Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
38 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Pedagogy in the Age of Statutes, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC.
227, 231 (1991).
39 Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory Committee,
and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 865 (1992);
Randolph Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evi-
dence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 746 (1990); Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1307 (1992).
40 FED. R. EVID. 402.
41 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2788 (1993).
42 Id.
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was the implied abolition of the Frye test. The Court then held
that none of the language in the Federal Rules could reasonably
bear the interpretation that scientific testimony is admissible only
when it is based on a consensus, generally accepted view.4 3 In so
holding, the Court found that both the district court and the court
of appeals erred, the district court in believing that Rule 703 in-
corporated Frye and the court of appeals in looking to the common
law as authority for continued enforcement of Frye.
Affirmatively, the seven-justice majority44 emphasized that de-
spite the demise of Frye, the federal trial judge still has a vital
gatekeeping or screening function to perform. The abolition of
Frye "does not mean ... that the Rules ... place no limits on the
admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence."45 The majority
found limitations "embodied in Rule 702 .. . 46 That statute
reads:
[I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.47
Specifically, Justice Blackmun focused on the expression, "sci-
entific ... knowledge," in the statute.4 8 He emphasized that sci-
ence is a process rather than a static body of knowledge.4 9 He
wrote that "in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an infer-
ence or assertion must be derived by the scientific method."" ° In
turn, he described that method as a validation technique,5
43 Id.
44 See Kirby, supra note 4, at S38. The Chief Justice and Justice John Paul Stevens did
not join in the parts of the opinion setting out a new test to replace Frye. They pointed out
that the grant of the petition for certiorari presented only the question of whether Frye was
still good law. However, if the other Justices had agreed, Daubert would have been:
a major setback for the effort to eliminate questionable science from the courtroom.
But the other justices would persuaded that simply reversing Frye would open the
floodgates to bad science. [T]hose seven justices went on to spell out "the nature and
source" of the trial judge's "gatekeeping responsibility" in terms that should exclude
much unreliable science ....
Id.
45 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794-95.
46 Id.
47 FED. R. EVID. 702.
48 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
1993]
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namely, the formulation of hypotheses and either experimentation
or observation to test the validity of the hypothesis.5 2 Under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 104(a),53 the trial judge must determine
whether the scientist's conclusion rests on sound scientific meth-
odology. In making that determination, the judge should consider
a number of factors, including whether the scientist's hypothesis
is testable, whether it has been tested, whether the hypothesis
has been subjected to peer review, whether the underlying meth-
odology has a known error rate, and whether the methodology
used to generate the conclusion is generally accepted.5 4 Justice
Blackmun underscored that "[t]he focus.., must be solely on [un-
derlying] principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate." 5
It is a foregone conclusion that the wisdom of the Daubert deci-
sion will long be debated. Until Daubert, Frye was the controlling
law in roughly two-thirds of the American jurisdictions.56 As re-
cently as the mid-1970s, the general acceptance test appeared to
be the governing standard in at least forty-five states. 7 In
Daubert, the Frye test "was vigorously defended by Merrell Dow
and a host of amici."58 Certainly, a case can be made that Daubert
places a heavy burden on federal trial judges by forcing them to
pass on the validity of scientific methodology.59 "The thought of
some [lay] judge deciding what is science and what is not evokes
unpleasant memories of Galileo."6" In his separate opinion in
Daubert, Chief Justice William Rehnquist cautioned that trial
judges are not "amateur scientists."6 '
The thesis, though, of this article is that it is a mistake to focus
on only the narrow question of whether the Daubert majority se-
lected the optimal test for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
The point of this article is that there was far more at stake in
52 See supra note 44 (discussing validity of hypothesis).
53 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 1 PAUL C. GIANNELI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5 (2d ed.
1993).
57 Betty R. Steingass, Note, Changing the Standard for the Admissibility of Novel Scien-
tific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 769 (1979).
58 Kirby, supra note 4, at S38.
59 Id. at S39.
60 See Chesebro, supra note 11, at 1639.
61 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct 2786, 2800 (1993) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Daubert merely than the future of either Bendectin litigation or
the law of scientific evidence. In a meaningful sense, what was at
stake in Daubert was the future of the law of evidence applied in
the federal courts. As Part One of this Article demonstrates, if the
Court had approved the district court's reasoning and held that
Rule 703 governed the question of the validity of the expert's hy-
pothesis, the Court would have made a shambles of the structure
of Article VII of the Federal Rules. Part Two explains that if the
Court had embraced the argument of several amici that Rule 702
somehow codified Frye's general acceptance standard, the Court
would have undercut the coherence of the overall organization of
the Federal Rules, in particular, the relationship among Articles
II, VII, and VIII. Finally, Part Three advances the contention that
if the Court had approved the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that Frye
survived as a common-law authority, the Court would have frus-
trated the basic congressional intent that the Federal Rules oper-
ate as a comprehensive evidence code. In short, whatever doubts
there may be that Daubert properly resolved the specific issue of
the standard for introducing scientific testimony, in the broader
context the Daubert Court was eminently correct; its decision was
the only way of vindicating the Federal Rules as a coherent and
comprehensive evidence code. In effect, the Court was faced with
the task of assembling three puzzles; the Court had to piece to-
gether the structure of Article VII of the Federal Rules, the overall
organization of the Rules, and the Rules' relation to the common
law of evidence. The Court's decision in Daubert was the right
piece for each puzzle.
I. THE FIRST PUZZLE: THE STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE VII OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. The Choice Facing the Court
One question the Court faced in Daubert was whether to look to
Rule 702 or Rule 703 for guidance. Rule 702 contained the expres-
sion, "scientific ... knowledge, 62 and there was therefore the pos-
sibility of extracting substantive admissibility standards from
that expression. However, the text and title of Rule 703 referred
62 FED. R. EVID. 702.
19931
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to the "bases" of an expert opinion.6 3 The term, "bases," is expan-
sive enough to include the scientific hypothesis underlying the ex-
pert's opinion. Furthermore, numerous courts and commentators
had looked to Rule 703 as authority for policing the validity of the
expert's theory.6 4 In Daubert, the district court treated Rule 703
as the source of that authority.65 Indeed, in their reply brief, even
the plaintiffs urged the Supreme Court to adopt the position that
Rule 703 was controlling.6 6
At first glance, that position is attractive. As previously stated,
at least viewed in isolation, the wording of the statutory text, "ba-
ses," is broad enough to encompass the scientific theory which the
scientist bases her opinion on. Again, in prior decisions constru-
ing the Federal Rules, the Rehnquist Court had consistently
adopted a textualist approach to interpretation.67 Furthermore, as
several amici argued,6 a passage in the official Advisory Commit-
tee Note to Rule 703 suggested that 703 governs the validity of the
expert's reasoning. That passage reads: "Th[is] rule .. .offers a
more satisfactory basis for ruling upon the admissibility of public
opinion poll evidence. Attention is directed to the validity of the
techniques employed rather than to relatively fruitless inquiries
whether hearsay is involved." a6
Although the Supreme Court generally favors a textualist ap-
proach to interpretation, most of the justices subscribe to a moder-
ate school of textualism, permitting consideration of extrinsic leg-
islative history material even when the statutory text may appear
to have a plain meaning.70 In particular, the Court has ascribed
significant weight to Advisory Committee Notes as an indicator of
63 See FED. R. EVID. 703.
64 2 GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL
RuLEs IN THE STATES § 52.3, at 103 (Cumin. Supp. 1992) (collecting cases); Edward J. Im-
winkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testi-
mony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1988) (collecting cases and articles).
65 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
66 Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9, Daubert (No. 92-102).
67 See supra notes 33-39 (discussing Supreme Court's textualist approach).
68 Brief for the American College of Legal Medicine in support of Respondent at 17,
Daubert (No. 92-102); Brief for the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association in support
of Respondent at 11, 22, Daubert (No. 92-102); Brief for the United States in support of
Respondent at 15, 26, Daubert (No. 92-102).
69 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
70 In re Brichard, 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("Recent Supreme Court
cases suggest that in all questions of statutory interpretation, a court may examine the
legislative history in order to avoid an 'unreflective' reading of a statute.").
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legislative intention.71 For that reason, the Advisory Note to Rule
703 could conceivably have prompted the Court to rule that 703
was governing.
B. The Court's Ultimate Decision
Despite the strength of the case for Rule 703, the Supreme
Court decided to turn to Rule 702 as the statutory basis for sub-
stantive admissibility standards for scientific evidence. 72 That de-
cision was not only defensible; 3 the decision was also essential if
the various provisions of Article VII of the Federal Rules are to
function as a coherent whole.
To be sure, the passage in the Advisory Committee's Note to
Rule 703 is suggestive. However, upon closer scrutiny, the pas-
sage does not say that Rule 703 prescribes the standards for eval-
uating "the validity of the techniques employed."74 The passage is
equally susceptible to the interpretation that by removing the
hearsay objection in public opinion poll cases, Rule 703 merely
clears the way for the courts to inquire into the validity issue, an
inquiry informed by standards supplied by another Federal Rules
provision such as Rule 702.
An analysis of the balance of the Advisory Committee's Note
confirms that the mission of Federal Rule 703 does not include
regulating the validity of the expert's underlying scientific theory
or principle. As one of the articles cited in Justice Blackmun's
opinion explains,75 when a scientist testifies at trial, her testi-
mony is normally syllogistic. 76 She applies a major premise (if a
patient displays symptoms A, B, and C, he suffers from illness D)
to a minor premise (this patient's case history includes symptoms
A, B, and C) to generate a conclusion (this patient suffers from
illness D). The major premise is the expert's scientific theory or
principle, and the minor premise sets out the case-specific facts to
which the expert applies the theory or principle. The information
71 See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 166 (1988) (attaching considerable
weight to advisory committee's note to Federal Rule 803(8)(c)).
72 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993).
73 See John W. Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testi-
mony by Restrictions on Function, Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 364 (1992)
(arguing Rule 702 may be construed as constituting "a textual basis for the courts... to
impose some stricter standard of reliability").
74 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
75 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793 n.4.
76 See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 64, at 1.
1993]
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contained in the expert's major premise differs qualitatively, in
kind, from the information factored into the minor premise.77 The
witness is testifying qua expert only when she is describing the
major premise.78 The minor premise contains the type of factual
information which the jurors normally evaluate.7 9 For example,
the expert might have included symptom C in her minor premise
because one of the patient's relatives told the expert that the pa-
tient exhibited that symptom. The expert may have an M.D.,
however, she did not take any special courses in credibility assess-
ment; and the lay jurors are equally qualified to decide whether
the relative is so biased in the patient's favor that the relative's
report is untrustworthy. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule
703 gives a number of examples of the Rule's scope: "Thus, a phy-
sician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from
numerous sources and of considerable variety, including state-
ments by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses,
technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays."80 All
of these examples are illustrations of the type of case-specific in-
formation which typically serves as the expert's minor premise.
Furthermore, an even earlier passage in the Advisory Commit-
tee's Note makes it clear that Rule 703 is designed to afford the
trial attorney an alternative to using the hypothetical question.8 '
When an attorney employs a hypothetical question at trial, the
virtually universal practice is that the attorney begins by asking
the expert to "assume the following facts." 2 In a Bendectin case,
the plaintiffs attorney might ask a physician to assume "facts"
about: the mother's prior medical history, the mother's preg-
nancy, her use of Bendectin, and the nature of the limb defects
with which her child was born. However, no judge in their right
mind would allow the attorney to include the following "facts" in
the hypothetical:
Doctor, I would also like you to assume that the scientific
community generally accepts the technique of reanalyzing ep-
idemiological data and that a reanalysis of the epidemiologi-
77 Id.
78 Id. at 8-13.
79 Id.
80 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
81 Id.
82 RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES 531 (3d ed. 1991).
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cal data on Bendectin yields a relationship which is statisti-
cally significant at the .05 level.
That is not the kind of data which the attorney is supposed to fur-
nish to the expert in the hypothesis. Quite to the contrary, that is
the type of information which the expert is supposed to furnish to
the court to help the trier of fact evaluate the specific facts in the
pending case; the witness's knowledge of epidemiology is the ex-
pertise which the witness contributes to the fact-finding process.
The hypothesis of assumed facts was never intended to serve as a
vehicle for inserting that type of scientific proposition into the rec-
ord. If the limited function of Rule 703 is to create an alternative
to the hypothetical question, it stands to reason that neither is
Rule 703 a vehicle for policing the validity of such scientific
propositions.
The official comment to Mississippi's version of Federal Rule
702 suggests the logic of using Rule 702 to police such proposi-
tions. If a witness qualifies as an expert, Rule 702 gives the wit-
ness latitude to voice opinions during the trial. However, as the
comment states, the witness enjoys that latitude only when the
witness is opining about "a matter within his purported field of
knowledge." The common-sense implication is that when a wit-
ness qualifies as an expert only because of her possession of "sci-
entific ... knowledge," she must confine the substance of her testi-
mony to propositions qualifying as "scientific... knowledge." The
concluding phrase in Rule 702 expressly permits expert testimony
in the "form" of an opinion or otherwise, but the substance of the
testimony must amount to "scientific ... knowledge."
In this light, the Daubert Court's decision to look to Rule 702
was supportable. More importantly for our purposes, considering
the decision in the broader context of the proper construction of
Article VII, the decision was virtually unavoidable. By its terms,
Rule 703 applies only to "[tihe facts or data in the particular case
upon which an expert bases an opinion.""3 The same terminology
appears twice in Rule 705: "The expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testi-
fying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
83 FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
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underlying facts or data on cross-examination."8 4
When a legislature uses the same words in different parts of a
statutory scheme, the court routinely presumes that the legisla-
ture intended that the words would have the identical meaning in
both parts of the statute.8 5 The presumption is entitled to special
weight when the two parts of the statutes are as close to each
other as Rules 703 and 705.
If "the underlying facts or data" mean the same thing in Rules
703 and 705, then Rule 703 cannot be interpreted as applying to
the expert's explanatory theory or technique. To hold that Rule
703 regulates the validity of the expert's scientific theory would
render Rule 705, and consequently, the structure of Article VII,
nonsensical.8 The face of Rule 705 provides that on direct exami-
nation, the expert may state the "reasons" for his opinion "without
first testifying to the underlying facts or data." The wording obvi-
ously assumes a distinction between "reasons," on the one hand,
and "underlying facts or data," on the other. However, to construe
"the facts or data" as encompassing all the bases of the expert's
opinion, including the scientific theory functioning as the major
premise, would obliterate that distinction. So construed, "the
facts or data" in Rules 703 and 705 include everything, and there
could be no other "reasons" for the opinion. A broad interpretation
of Rule 703 reduces Rule 705 to an absurdity; such a reading of
Rule 703 empties the term "reasons" in Rule 705 of any possible
meaning. If "the facts and data" include both the major and minor
premise components of the expert's reasoning process, there are
no other "reasons" which the witness can possibly "give" on direct
examination. Rather than a useful provision, Rule 705 becomes
an embarrassment. There "is no principle of statutory . . . con-
struction that takes precedence over the" maxim that an absurd
interpretation is to be avoided.8 7
As provisions in the same article of the Federal Rules, Rules 703
and 705 must be harmonized."' The only way to reconcile them is
84 FED. R. EVID. 705 (emphasis added).
85 See Boise Cascade Corp. v. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991); S & M Invest-
ment Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 324, 327 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 1087 (1991); Barnson v. United States, 816 F.2d 549, 554 (10th Cir. 1987);
Doctors Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1987).
86 Imwinkelried, supra note 64, at 16-17.
87 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Los Angeles, 787 P.2d 996, 1007 (Cal. 1990).
88 People v. Trimble, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 495, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Lambert Steel v.
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to construe the expression, "the facts or data," as meaning only the
case-specific information which the expert utilizes as her minor
premise. However, once Rule 703 is limited in this fashion, Rule
702 naturally assumes the function of regulating the expert's ma-
jor premises. Now all the pieces of the Article VII puzzle fall
neatly into place. Rule 704 limits the phrasing of the ultimate
conclusion; 9 Rule 703 regulates the type of information which the
expert may factor into her minor premise; and as the Daubert
Court correctly ruled, Rule 702 "embodie[s]" the restrictions on
the expert's major premise.9" It is Rule 702 which is the source of
the requirements that the trial judge find that the expert's testi-
mony will assist the trier of fact and that the expert's conclusion
has been validated as "scientific knowledge" in the sense that it
rests on sound methodology. By locating those restrictions in Rule
702, the Daubert Court gave Article VII of the Federal Rules a
sensible, coherent structure.
II. THE SECOND PUZZLE: THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Part One explained why the Daubert Court's decision to look to
Rule 702 rather than Rule 703 was the only decision that made
sense in terms of the structure of Article VII of the Federal Rules.
If the Court had chosen to attempt to extract the restrictions on
the expert's major premise from Rule 703, the Court would have
reduced Rule 705 to nonsense. Thus, the context of Article VII
dictated that the Court solve the first puzzle by situating the re-
strictions in Rule 702.
A. The Choice Facing the Court
Of course, Article VII itself is part of a broader context. The
larger puzzle is the structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
including not only Article VII but Articles II and VIII as well. To
Heller Financial, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 456 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Looney v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
89 FED. R. EVID. 704(a). Rule 704(a) states: "Except as otherwise provided in subdivision
(b), testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectiona-
ble because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Id.; see also
Steven I. Friedland, Expert Testimony on the Law: Excludable or Justifiable?, 37 U. MIAM
L. REV. 451, 453-55 (1983) (courts construing rule as prohibiting opinions on pure questions
of law).
90 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
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solve that puzzle, the Court had to determine whether Rule 702
imposed the restriction that scientific witnesses' testimony be
based only on generally accepted conclusions and theories. The
Frye decision imposed that restriction. 91 In Frye, a 1923 case, the
accused offered exculpatory testimony about the results of a sys-
tolic blood pressure test. That test was a forerunner of the con-
temporary polygraph test. The test results supposedly indicated
that the accused responded truthfully when he denied committing
the charged crime. The trial judge excluded the testimony, and
the appellate court affirmed the exclusion for the stated reason
that most experts in specialties such as psychology had not yet
accepted the conclusion that the test accurately diagnosed
deception.
Merrell Dow and several of the supporting amici implored the
Daubert Court to hold that the Federal Rules mandated trial
judges to continue enforcing the Frye, general acceptance stan-
dard. In its brief in support of Merrell Dow, the American Insur-
ance Association asked the Court to rule that Rule 702 "imposes
[the] requirement that the scientific propositions upon which an
expert bases his testimony must be [generally] accepted as valid
in the scientific community before they properly may be the sub-
ject of ... expert testimony."92 Similarly, the amicus brief for the
Journal of the American Medical Association urged the Court to
apply Frye to "the [scientific] proposition" which the expert pro-
poses to present to the trier of fact.93
Likewise, the Defense Research Institute requested that the
Court extend Frye to "the conclusion reached" by the expert. 94
Like the request that the Court look to Rule 703, at first blush the
request that the Court adhere to the general acceptance test was
an attractive one. As Merrell Dow stressed in its brief,95 even at
the late date of the eve of the Daubert decision the Frye rule was
still the prevailing view in both federal and state courts in the
91 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also GIANNELLI &
IMWiNKLEREm, supra note 56, at § 1-5.
92 Brief for the American Insurance Association in support of Respondent at 7, Daubert
(No. 92-102).
93 Brief for the New England Journal of Medicine, Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation, and Annals of Internal Medicine in support of Respondent at 14-15, Daubert (No.
92-102).
94 Brief for the Defense Research Institute, Inc. in support of Respondent at 15, Daubert
(No. 92-102).
95 Respondent's Brief at 25, Daubert (No. 92-102).
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United States.96 Frye was the law in roughly two-thirds of the ju-
risdictions. 97 Merrell Dow was guilty of only slight overstatement
when it asserted that the Frye rule "has long and uniformly been
recognized at common law."98 In the lead opinion, Justice Black-
mun conceded that Frye "has been the dominant standard ...."99
Frye was not only a hoary precedent and the clear weight of au-
thority; it had recently been bolstered by Huber's policy argument
that the general acceptance test was a needed bulwark against
jury reliance on "junk" science. In its amicus brief, the American
Tort Reform Association argued that without the tool of the Frye
test, trial judges would be powerless to bar testimony about "frivo-
lous [scientific] theories."100 In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit em-
braced that argument. 101 The court voiced its belief that scientific
testimony can overwhelm a lay jury. Quoting Galileo's Revenge,
the court indicated that the best method of separating the wheat
from the chaff, the good science from the bad, was to use the crite-
rion of general acceptance or consensus.
B. The Court's Ultimate Decision
Notwithstanding the considerable appeal of the Frye test, the
Court held that Frye was no longer good law in federal court. The
majority announced that while general acceptance of the expert's
theory "can .. .have a bearing on" the admissibility of scientific
testimony, 0 2 foundational proof of general acceptance was not "a
neccesary precondition to admissibility" of scientific evidence. 10 3
As in the case of the Court's choice to look to Rule 702 rather than
Rule 703, the Court's decision to abandon Frye was not only sup-
portable; the decision was also critical if the Court was to make
some sense of the overall organization of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
The decision is defensible both as a matter of statutory con-
struction and as a matter of evidentiary policy. The language of
96 GLANNELLI & IMWINKLEREID, supra note 56, § 1-5.
97 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique
from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REv. 554, 557-59 (1983).
98 Respondent's Brief at 24, Daubert (No. 92-102).
99 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2792 (1993).
100 Brief for the American Tort Reform Association in support of Respondent at 11,
Daubert (No. 92-102).
101 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991).
102 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
103 Id. at 2799.
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Rule 702 would have to be tortured to incorporate the Frye test.
When the drafters wanted to prescribe a general acceptance test,
they found apt words to do so. For example, Rule 803(17) states:
"The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness: ... Market Reports, Com-
mercial Publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, direc-
tories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied
upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations." 10 4
There is no comparable language in Rule 702. For their part,
the Michigan drafters decided to retain the Frye rule. 10 5 However,
they realized that Rule 702's language did not embody a general
acceptance test. They consequently amended their version of Rule
702 to include appropros language, namely, the adjective "recog-
nized."' °6 Without that additional language, there is nothing in
the text of Rule 702 which even faintly implies that the statute
conditions the admissibility of scientific testimony on proof of the
widespread acceptance of the scientific proposition.
The Daubert Court's decision can certainly be defended as a
matter of evidentiary policy. While courts such as the Ninth Cir-
cuit often assert that lay jurors are awed by scientific testimony,
there is little empirical support for that assertion. 0 7 Quite to the
contrary, there is research data indicating that lay jurors have the
capacity "to discount expert testimony .... 8 Summarizing the
research to date, two commentators concluded that "[t]he image of
a spellbound jury mesmerized by the gilded testimony of a forensic
expert" represents fantasy rather than reality."109 To put the mat-
ter bluntly, the assertions of lay jurors' incompetence are largely
unsubstantiated.
Furthermore, by elevating general acceptance to the status of
104 FED. R. EVID. 803(17) (emphasis added).
105 Mulholland v. DEC Int'l Corp., 443 N.W.2d 340, 343 n.1 (Mich. 1989). "Thus the
Michigan rule emphasized the role of the court in determining the preliminary issues of
admissibilty in general as well as the inadmissibility of scientific evidence under the Frye
rule in particular." Id.; see also People v. Marsh, 441 N.W.2d 33, 35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
106 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 64, at § 15.5.
107 See generally Imwinkelried, supra note 97, at 554.
108 Elizabeth Loftus & John Monahan, Trial by Data: Psychological Research as Legal
Evidence, AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST, Mar. 1980, at 270, 276; see also ABA Special Committee on
Jury Comprehension, Jury Comprehension in Complex Cases 40 (1989). "Jurors seemed to
have no difficulty rejecting or at least diregarding testimony of experts whom they re-
garded simply as 'hired guns'..... "Id.
109 Richard Rogers & Charles P. Ewing, Ultimate Opinion Proscriptions: A Cosmetic Fux
and a Plea for Empiricism, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 357, 363 (1989).
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the "exclusive" criterion for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence, 110 Frye misled the courts into ignoring the questions which
are the direct determinants of scientific merit such as the issue of
the size of the researcher's database and the accuracy rate which
she attained during the experiment:1 1' "Frye is a crude, unscien-
tific [test] for gauging scientific testimony; it amounts to assessing
validity by counting heads. To prove a hypothesis a researcher
must do more than poll colleagues or ask for a show of hands at a
scientific convention."112 At the very least, it was justifiable for
the Daubert majority to shift the focus from the popularity of the
expert's conclusion to the soundness of the methodology used to
generate the conclusion. In the words of one of the amicus briefs
quoted by Justice Blackmun, 1 13 a brief filed on behalf of six Nobel
Laureates, "[i]t is how the conclusions are reached, not what the
conclusions are, that makes them 'good science' . ...
More importantly for our current inquiry, the overall structure
of the Federal Rules of Evidence left the Court with virtually no
choice but to refuse to read a general acceptance requirement into
Rule 702. Rule 702 is not the only device for feeding scientific
data into the judicial system; there are similar input mechanisms
scattered throughout the Federal Rules. There are at least two
other mechanisms: the judicial notice provisions in Article II of
the Federal Rules and the learned treatise hearsay exception in
Article VIII. Just as a decision to look to Rule 703 would have
wreaked havoc with the stucture of Article VII, a decision to su-
perimpose Frye onto Rule 702 would have muddied the relation-
ship between Article VII and Articles II and VIII.
Article VIII codifies a learned treatise hearsay exception in Rule
803(18). That exception authorizes the receipt of a passage in
"published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of his-
tory, medicine, or other science or art, established as reliable au-
thority .... "1 15 To invoke this exception, the proponent must lay a
predicate, including proof that the text or periodical in question is
generally accepted as authoritative within the pertinent spe-
110 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
Ill Edward J. Imwinkelried, Abolish the "Frye" Test, 12 CAL. LAw., Apr. 1992, at 63.
112 Id.
113 Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
114 Brief for Nicholas Bloemberger as Amici Curiae at 22, Daubert (No. 92-102).
115 FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
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cialty. 1 1 6 General acceptance is part of the requisite foundation,
but it is the text which must be generally accepted rather than the
scientific theory stated in the passage which the proponent
proffers.
For its part, Article II of the Federal Rules sets out the verifia-
ble certainty basis of judicial notice. Rule 201(b)(2) provides that
a trial judge may dispense with formal evidence by judicially no-
ticing a proposition when the proposition is "capable of accurate
and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy can-
not reasonably be questioned. " 1 17 The courts frequently apply this
provision to scientific propositions. 118 However, before a court will
do so, the proponent must persuade the judge that the proposition
is widely accepted within the pertinent scientific specialty." 9
Again, a showing of general acceptance is necessary; however
under Article II, the showing must relate to the scientific proposi-
tion in question.
In its amicus brief supporting Merrell Dow, the American Insur-
ance Association conceded that Rules 201 and 803(18) were ger-
mane to the question of the proper interpretation of Rule 702.120
The association argued that the three statutes are in pari
materia12 and that since Rule 803(18) requires proof of the gen-
eral acceptance of the noticed proposition, Rule 702 should be con-
strued as codifying "a comparable.. . standard .... 122
The association was correct in observing that as parts of the
same statutory scheme, Rules 201 and 803(18) can help shed light
on the meaning of Rule 702 even though the former provisions ap-
pear in different articles of the Federal Rules. However, on closer
examination, Rules 201 and 803(18) not only cut against the asso-
cation's argument; they further demonstrate that the broader con-
text of the overall structure of the Federal Rules compelled the
Daubert Court's choice to jettison Frye.
If the Court had read Rule 702 as requiring proof of the general
116 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Learned Scientific Treatises Under Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(18), TRiAL, Feb. 1982, at 57.
117 FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2).
118 GIANNELLI & IMWINKLEREID, supra note 56, at § 1-2.
119 Id.; see also CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 330 (4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE].
120 Brief for the American Insurance Association in support of Respondent at 10-17,
Daubert (No. 92-102).
121 Id. at 10.
122 Id. at 11-12.
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acceptance of the scientific proposition itself, the Court would
have essentially equated the standards under Rules 702 and
201(b)(2). Like the judicial notice standard, the test for the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence would necessitate a showing of the
general acceptance of the proposition. For all practical purposes,
Rule 702 would duplicate 201(b)(2) and Rules 201 and 702 would
be redundant. 123 "A construction ascribing to two separate [statu-
tory] provisions the same meaning and scope is disfavored."' 24
The cases are legion holding that a court must presume that a
legislature does not intend any of its enactments to be superflu-
ous. 125 It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction 126 that
each statutory provision should have independent force; 127 if at all
possible, every provision should be interpreted as serving a dis-
tinctive, useful function. 128 Courts are reluctant to approve any
proposed interpretation which renders a statutory provision even
partially 21 inoperative. 130 If Daubert had held that Rule 702 codi-
fied the same general acceptance standard as Rule 201(b)(2), the
statutes would be "repetitive."' 3 1 If the proponent can show the
general acceptance of the scientific proposition, there would be no
need to present expert testimony under Rule 702; the same show-
ing would entitle the proponent to judicial notice of the proposi-
tion under Rule 201. It is far more rational to think that Congress
intended Rule 702 to embody a different threshold. In sum, it is
123 Beef Nebraska, Inc. v. United States, 807 F.2d 712, 717 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating court
should avoid constructions which render statutory provisions redundant).
124 United States v. Szwaczka, 769 F. Supp. 293, 297 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
125 Board of Transp. of Trucking Emp. Pension Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 504 (3d
Cir. 1992); In re Oxborrow, 913 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir. 1990); Central Montana Elec. v.
Administrator of Bonneville Power, 840 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1988); Gifford Pinchot
Alliance v. Butruille, 752 F. Supp. 967, 970 (D. Or. 1990); Fox-Knapp, Inc. v. Employers
Mut. Cas., 725 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 893 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1989).
126 R. E. Dietz Corp. v. United States, 939 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1991); Marc Dev., Inc. v.
FDIC, 771 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (D. Utah 1991), affd, 992 F.2d 1503 (10th Cir. 1993);
DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, 706 F. Supp. 1479, 1495 (1989), affd,
914 F.2d 267 (11th Cir. 1990). The ancient maxim is "ut res magis valeat quam pereat." Id.
127 Darling v. Bowen, 878 F.2d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066
(1990); Brodheim v. Rowland, 783 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd in part,
vacated in part, 993 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1993); Bravo Vending v. Rancho Mirage, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 164, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); R.R.L.H., Inc. v. Saddleback Valley Sch. Dist., 272
Cal. Rptr. 529, 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Atlantic Richfield v. California, 262 Cal. Rptr. 683,
689 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
128 Ceja v. J. R. Wood, Inc., 242 Cal. Rptr. 531, 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
129 In re Roxford Foods, 790 F. Supp. 987, 991 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
130 Mail Order Ass'n of America v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
131 Haynes v. United States, 891 F.2d 235, 239 (9th Cir. 1989).
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ridiculous to assume that a showing of general acceptance of the
proposition is the standard for Rule 702 when the very same
showing will trigger the judicial notice provisions of Rule 201.
In the 1954 edition of his famous hornbook, Dean Charles Mc-
Cormick argued that although general acceptance of the proposi-
tion is the correct standard for judicial notice, the test for admissi-
bility of expert admissibility should be both different and more
relaxed.' 3 2 In 1993, the Daubert Court proved Dean McCormick
correct. In light of Daubert, each input mechanism for scientific
information performs a unique and useful purpose. When a scien-
tific proposition is so generally accepted that the court can dis-
pense with formal evidence and go to the length of giving the jury
a mandatory instruction to accept the proposition as a given,' 33
Rule 201(b)(2) controls. If the question is whether a scientific text
may be quoted to the jury, Rule 803(18) governs. Under Rule
803(18), the proponent need not show that the passage to be
quoted embodies a well-settled proposition; but the proponent
must demonstrate that the text is generally accepted as authorita-
tive. Finally, when the issue is whether a witness may give live
testimony about a proposition, as under Rule 803(18) the propo-
nent need not show that the proposition itself is generally ac-
cepted; but under Rule 702, the proponent must come forward
with foundational proof that the witness used generally accepted
methodology to generate the proposition.
The state of the research on a particular scientific issue may be
such that under Rule 201(b)(2), the trial judge can judicially notice
one proposition as the only tenable position on a certain scientific
issue. However, in many cases, the state of the scientific art will
preclude judicial notice of the truth of any particular position;
there may be "a genuine debate" within the discipline over the is-
sue.'3 There might be several "competing scientific... claims,"' 35
all resting on sufficiently sound methodology to pass muster
under Daubert. While the scientific record may preclude judicial
notice under Rule 201, the record might nevertheless permit one
or both litigants to resort to Rule 702. The drafters not only went
to the trouble to include separate input mechanisms, Rules 201,
132 Ci AEs McCoRMIcKc, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 170, at 363 (1954).
133 FED. R. EvID. 201(g).
134 Respondent's Brief at 30, Daubert (No. 92-102).
135 Id. at 15 n.8.
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702, and 803(18), in the Federal Rules; they even placed those
mechanisms in different articles of the Rules. In attempting to
divine the meaning of Rule 702, the court should consider the "de-
sign of the statut[ory scheme] as a whole."' 36 Reading Frye into
Rule 702 would make a mockery of the scheme of the Federal
Rules. The only way to give independent effect to the mechanisms
dispersed in Articles II, VII, and VIII is to conclude, as did the
Daubert Court, that Rule 702 turns on the acceptability of the un-
derlying scientific methodology rather than the general accept-
ance of the resulting conclusion.
III. THE THIRD PUZZLE: THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE
LAW AS A WHOLE
Part One of this article discussed the structure of Article VII of
the Federal Rules. However, Part Two pointed out that Article
VII is part of the broader context, and the larger puzzle of the
statutory scheme of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Part Three
addresses a still broader context, namely, federal evidence law as
a whole. The Federal Rules themselves are part of a larger puzzle:
federal evidence law including both the statutory provisions and
the case law dealing with evidentiary issues. How do the federal
statutes and cases fit together?
A. The Choice Facing the Court
In his lead opinion, Justice Blackmun declared that the Federal
"Rules occupy the field."1 37 However, even a cursory review of the
statutory provisions reveals that the Federal Rules fall short of
constituting a completely self-contained evidence code. Initially,
the Rules do not speak to all related procedural questions. For
instance, there is no statutory definition of the scope of redirect
examination. Moreover, the Rules say little about the standards
for evaluating the legal sufficiency of evidence. By way of exam-
ple, the Rules do not specify the quantum of evidence necessary to
sustain the initial burden of production. 138 Lastly, the Rules do
not even purport to comprehensively regulate all admissibility
136 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Secretary of Agric., 813 F. Supp. 882, 887 n.7 (D. D.C.
1993).
137 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993).
138 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 119, at § 338.
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questions. The premier illustration is the huge window to the
common law in Rule 501:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory author-
ity, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. 139
The Conference Committee Report on Rule 501 specifically states
that the Rule authorizes the courts to evolve a "federal common
law" of evidentiary privilege.
140
However, to use Justice Blackmun's expressions, with those ex-
ceptions, the Federal Rules appear to "occupy the field." The ques-
tion presented in Daubert was whether they not only apparently
but actually occupy the fields such as opinion evidence which they
expressly regulate in detail. Merrell Dow itself contended that the
Court could derive the necessary evidentiary restrictions from
Rule 702. However, many of the amici supporting Merrell Dow
went further and asked the Court to hold that federal trial judges
retain the common-law power to formulate and enforce uncodified
exclusionary rules. The American College of Legal Medicine
championed the argument that the Rules countenance additional
"judicially-created doctrines." 14 1 The Chamber of Commerce ar-
gued that trial judges may enforce "a traditional common law
rule" such as Frye so long as the text of the Federal Rules does not
clearly manifest any intent to overturn the rule. 142 Furthermore,
the Washington Legal Foundation similarly contended that "Frye
may be sustained as a judge-made rule independent of the Federal
"1143Rules of Evidence ....
Like the requests that the Court look to Rule 703 or read Frye
into the Federal Rules, this contention has some superficial ap-
139 FED. R. EVID. 501.
140 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974).
141 Brief for the American College of Legal Medicine in support of Respondent at 6,
Daubert (No. 92-102).
142 Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in support of
Respondent at 16, Daubert (No. 92-102).
143 Brief for Washington Legal Foundation in support of Respondent at 11, Daubert (No.
92-102).
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peal. The Daubert Court was not writing on a clean slate; as pre-
viously stated, at the time of its decision, the Frye rule was the
controlling test in the majority of federal and state courts. More-
over, it is probable that some of the more conservative Justices are
in sympathy with Mr. Huber's contention that relaxed evidentiary
standards, permitting the admission of "junk science" in product
liability and toxic tort suits, contribute to the competitive disad-
vantage of American businesses in world markets. Those Justices
might have been tempted to strike a blow against "junk" science
by affirming the lower courts' power to enforce Frye as a common-
law restriction. Furthermore, as respected evidence commenta-
tors have argued, 144 recognizing that power would give the trial
bench authority to flexibly adapt evidentiary rules to the nuances
of particular trials.145 These commenatators have quite properly
insisted that such authority is "guided by the inherent discretion-
ary powers of the federal trial judiciary." 46
The Daubert Court faced the task of integrating the Federal
Rules of Evidence with the federal case or decisional law on evi-
dence. As the above paragraph indicated, the Court could have
declared that the federal courts still have extensive authority to
supplement the statutory provisions by enforcing uncodified ex-
clusionary rules, at least when the rules were well-settled at com-
mon law prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules. Alternatively,
the Court could rule that federal judges have limited authority to
formulate decisional exclusionary rules only when statutory provi-
sions such as Rule 501 create windows to the common law.
B. The Court's Ultimate Decision
The Court chose the latter option. Perhaps more than any of its
other decisions in Daubert, the Court's resolution of this issue was
vital to the future of federal evidence law. The issue transcended
the controversy over the admissibility of scientific testimony and
raised the question of whether the Court would maintain the mo-
mentum for the reform of American Jurisprudence evidence law.
The centerpiece in this issue is Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
Rule 402 reads: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
144 Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 passim (1992).
145 Id. at 1325, 1329-30, 1332-39.
146 Id. at 1339.
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otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by
Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which
is not relevant is riot admissible."' 47
The exceptive language at the end of the first sentence of Rule
402 lists the sources of authority for formulating exclusionary
rules of evidence which can bar the introduction of logically rele-
vant evidence. As the introduction to this article noted, the list
includes the Constitution, the Federal Rules of Evidence, other
congressional statutes, and "rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority." Conspicuously, though,
there is no mention of case or decisional law in the text of the
statute. That omission suggests that standing alone, case law
cannot serve as a basis for excluding relevant, otherwise admissi-
ble evidence. The wording of Rule 402 implies that the federal
courts have lost the common-law authority which the amici in
Daubert urged the Court to exercise in order to uphold Frye.
In rejecting that urging, the Court refused to frustrate the legis-
lative intention of Rule 402. All the pertinent indicia of legislative
intent point to the conclusion that Rule 402 was calculated to de-
prive the judiciary of the power to enforce categorical, exclusion-
ary rules of evidence which have no basis in the language of the
Federal Rules.
The omission of any mention of case law in the text of Rule 402
implies that intent, and the context of the Federal Rules, notably
Rule 501, strengthens the implication. When the drafters wanted
to preserve the courts' common-law power to evolve a particular
type of evidentiary doctrine such as privileges, the drafters ex-
pressly said so. For example, in Rule 501 they used the term of
art, "the common law."148 If the drafters had contemplated that
the courts could exercise general common-law power consistently
with Rule 402, it would have been a simple matter to have in-
serted a reference to "the common law" in that statute.
The extrinsic legislative history materials make the implication
well nigh irresistible. For its part, the Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 402 precludes any argument that the omission of any men-
tion of common law in Rule 402 is a simple, inadvertent oversight.
147 FED. R. EVID. 402.
148 FED. R. EVID. 501.
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In another respect, that Advisory Committee's Note refers to the
common law.'4 9 The committee which drafted Rule 402 had the
common law on its mind, but it evidently decided not to insert the
common law in the list of sources of authority for formulating ex-
clusionary rules. During the committee hearings on the then pro-
posed Federal Rules, the witnesses testified on the assumption
that "except where [as in Rule 501] the Federal Rules of Evidence
otherwise provide, there would be no decisional law of evi-
dence."150 One witness testified point blank that if Congress en-
acted the Federal Rules, the judicial creation of evidentiary doc-
trine "will in all probability be prevented."151 The "political
context" of Congress's consideration of the Federal Rules lends
further support.15 2 In construing a statute, a court may consider
the "history of the times."'53 The time of Congress's study of the
Federal Rules was the period immediately after Watergate. Con-
gress had just battled the President in the federal courts and
fought past evidentiary claims to obtain the documents it needed
to investigate the Watergate scandal.' 54 Congress adopted the
Federal Rules at a time when it was especially jealous of its pre-
rogatives vis-A-vis both the Executive and the Judiciary.
Subsequent developments not only confirmed this interpreta-
tion of Rule 402, but also demonstrated that the Supreme Court
subscribed to this interpretation. In 1978, the reporter for the
Federal Rules, the late Professor Edward Cleary, wrote a classic
article about the interpretation of the Federal Rules.15 5 In that
article, Professor Cleary wrote:
[I]n principle, under the Federal Rules of Evidence no com-
mon law of evidence remains. "All relevant evidence is admis-
sible, except as otherwise provided. . . ." In reality, of course,
the body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though
in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the
149 Id.
150 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 5199, at 222 (1978).
151 Id. at n.17.
152 See CARLSON ET AL., supra note 82, at 47.
153 Flowmaster, Inc. v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 671 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
154 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing "political context" of Con-
gress's consideration of Federal Rules of Evidence).
155 Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L.
REv. 908 (1978).
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exercise of delegated powers. 156
The last sentence of the quotation indicates that federal courts
may still look to the common law for the limited purpose of help-
ing them remove any ambiguities in the text of the Rules. The
middle sentence is a direct quotation from Rule 402. The initial
sentence explains the net effect of Rule 402-"[i]n principle, under
the Federal Rules of Evidence no common law of evidence re-
mains." To make his intent even clearer, Professor Cleary foot-
noted this passage with a citation to a Ninth Circuit opinion stat-
ing that the Federal Rules foreclose the common-law development
of evidentiary doctrine. 5 ' In 1984, in United States v. Abel,' 58 the
Supreme Court cited Rule 402 and approvingly quoted this very
passage from Professor Cleary's article. 5 9 In Daubert, the Court
again quoted the same passage.16 0 The Daubert Court was even
more emphatic about the central role which Rule 402 plays in the
structure of the Federal Rules; the Court described Rule 402 as
"the baseline" of the statutory scheme.1
6 1
Resurrecting the common law, Frye rule would not only have
frustrated the intent of Rule 402; more importantly, it also would
have imperiled the future of federal evidence law. Rule 402 is a
pivotal provision because it prevents the federal courts from re-
trenching on evidence law reform. To be sure, despite the pro-
gress made when Congress approved the Federal Rules, the
United States still has the most complex, restrictive set of eviden-
tiary rules in the world.' 62 When the Federal Rules went into ef-
fect, they legislated a simpler, more liberal set of evidentiary
norms biased in favor of the admission of logically relevant evi-
dence; the Federal Rules materially relaxed such exclusionary
rules as the best evidence, opinion, and hearsay doctrines.
Although the Federal Rules which revise particular exclusion-
ary rules, such as hearsay, reflect the Rules' bias in favor of ad-
mitting relevant evidence, the bias is clearest in the trilogy of Fed-
eral Rules 401 to 403. Rule 401 prescribes an expansive definition
156 Id. at 915.
157 Id. at 915 n.27 (federal courts no longer "free" to promulgate evidentiary rules in-
dependent of Federal Rules (citing U.S. v. Grajeda, 570 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1978))).
158 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
159 Id. at 51-52.
160 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993).
161 Id. at 2793.
162 Imwinkelried, supra note 64, at 3.
[Vol. 9:5
RIGHT PIECE OF THE PUZZLE
of logically relevant evidence. 16 3 The Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 401 clearly indicates that the drafters set out to codify a
definition even broader than the supposedly liberal definition in
the California Evidence Code. 164 It is true that in Rule 403, the
drafters gave trial judges discretionary authority to exclude logi-
cally relevant evidence when the attendant probative dangers
such as prejudice substantially outweigh the probative worth of
the evidence. 6 ' However, trial judges may exercise their power
under Rule 403 only on an ad hoc, case-specific basis; they may
not utilize Rule 403 as a source of power to formulate categorical,
exclusionary rules.1 6 6 Moreover, Rule 403 assigns the risk of non-
persuasion to the party opposing the admission of logically rele-
vant evidence; once the proponent demonstrates the relevance of
the evidence under Rule 401, the opponent must shoulder the bur-
den of convincing the trial judge that the incidental probative
risks outstrip the probative value by a wide margin.1 67
As important as Rules 401 and 403 are, "Rule 402 is potentially
the most important" component of the Rules' statutory scheme.'
68
As a generalization, the restrictive evidentiary rules still in effect
in the United States are the heritage of the common law; for the
most part, they are the work product of common-law courts.
Those courts have had a veritable fascination with the prolifera-
tion of exclusionary rules of evidence.' 69 When Congress enacted
the Federal Rules, American evidence law took an important step
forward toward rational simplification. However, if the Daubert
Court had permitted continued adherence to the Frye rule as a
common-law doctrine, the Court would have empowered the judi-
ciary to undo Congress's work. A decision to uphold a general ac-
ceptance rule of common-law origin would certainly have violated
the intent of Rule 402. More fundamentally, the decision would
necessarily have sanctioned the theory that uncodified, case law
exclusionary rules survived the enactment of the Federal Rules.
163 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 119, at § 184.
164 FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
165 FED. R. EVID. 403.
166 Edward J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Pre-
liminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 577, 615 (1984).
167 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 318-19.
168 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RuLs OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 174-75 (1981).
169 Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., California's 'Restatement" of Evidence: Some Reflections on
Appellate Repair of the Codification Fiasco, 4 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 279, 306 (1971).
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That decision would have been disastrous.
CONCLUSION
It is predictable that in the near future, the commentary on
Daubert will focus on the question of whether the Court selected
the best test for determining the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. 170 However, for the long term, it is important to appreciate
that the stakes in Daubert were much higher than the future of
scientific evidence. If the Daubert Court has approved continued
enforcement of the Frye test as a common-law standard, its deci-
sion would have invited lower courts to superimpose case law limi-
tations on the admission of relevant evidence; the decision would
have been a major setback to the efforts of simplifying and liberal-
izing federal evidence law. If the Court had strained the language
of Rule 702 to read in a general acceptance requirement, its deci-
sion would have made a shambles of the relationship among Arti-
cles II, VII, and VII of the Federal Rules; given Rule 201, that
decision would have reduced Rule 702 to a redundancy. Finally,
as we have seen, if the Court had looked to Rule 703 to evaluate
the validity of the expert's underlying theory, its decision would
have muddled the structure of Article VII. In short, the real stake
in Daubert was the future of federal evidence law as a progressive,
coherent body of rules. The Daubert Court's decision, deriving a
methodological test from "scientific knowledge" in statutory Rule
702, was the only way to safeguard that future.
This article is intended as more than an apologia for Daubert.
The same question will now arise in state after state. Although
Daubert resolves the question for federal practice, Daubert is
merely persuasive authority in the states. Thirty-five states have
already adopted evidence codes patterned after the Federal Rules,
and similar codes will be taking effect in other jurisdictions, in-
cluding Indiana and New Jersey, by the beginning of 1994. Those
jurisdictions may soon have to decide whether to follow the lead of
the Daubert Court.
170 See Bert Black & John A. Singer, From Frye to Daubert: A New Test for Scientific
Evidence, 1 SHEPARD'S, July 1993, at 19; Stephen A. Brunette, Daubert Has Immediate
Impact?, 1 SHEPARD'S, July 1993, at 107; George W. Conk, Commentary: Daubert v. Merrell
Dow, 1 SHEPARD'S, July 1993, at 55; Michael D. Green, Relief at the Frying of Frye: Reflec-
tions on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1 SHEPARD's, July 1993, at 43; Kirby,
supra note 4, at 538; Barry N. Nace, Reaction to Daubert, 1 SHEPARD's, July 1993, at 51.
[Vol. 9:5
RIGHT PIECE OF THE PUZZLE
In most states, the wording of the pertinent provisions, Federal
Rules 201, 402, 702-03, and 803(18), is virtually identical to that
of the Federal Rules.1 7 1 For that reason, there is a decent likeli-
hood that many, if not most, of the affected states will fall in step
with Daubert. However, on more than one occasion, courts in
these states have displayed an independent streak and refused to
adopt the Supreme Court's reading of the corresponding Federal
Rule. 172 Since so many of those states are presently committed to
the Frye rule,' 73 those courts may be reluctant to shift to the
Daubert approach. Honesty demands acknowledging that, other
factors being equal, a plausible case can be made for Frye. The
point of this article, though, is that the other factors are not equal.
Under the Federal Rules and in the states with similar evidence
codes, the question of the standard for admitting scientific evi-
dence must be decided in context, as part of the larger puzzles of
Article VII, the Evidence Rules as a whole, and the overall corpus
of evidence doctrine. As the Supreme Court observed in the King
case, the meaning of any statutory language depends on con-
text.' 74 In Daubert, the broader contexts compelled the result
reached by the Court.
171 See JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 64, § 52.3, at 103.
172 See People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366 (Colo.), modified, No. 89-SC507, 1991 Colo.
LEXIS 104 (Colo. Feb. 25, 1991); Phillips v. State, 591 So. 2d 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
173 See JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 64, at § 51.5.
174 King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 570, 573 (1991).
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